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Abstract
When national competitiveness is invoked as a policy objective, trade experts have learned
to retort that countries don't trade, ¯rms do. This focus on the importance of the ¯rm in
international trade is consistent with the most recent developments in trade theory, but policy
needs to catch up. Recognizing the growing anomalies in observed trade patterns relative to
traditional models of trade based on national comparative advantage, the \new trade theory"
of the 1980s looked at industries not countries, leading Nobel prize-winner Paul Krugman, a
pioneer in this literature, to suggest the need for a new trade policy. Recent work on what some
call the \new-new trade theory" focuses on the trading behaviour of individual ¯rms, making a
tight link between trade and productivity. In this paper we demonstrate how focusing on ¯rms
should be the foundation for a new-new trade policy, one that creates exciting opportunities
for trade and investment promotion strategies, along with the need for much more targeted
consultation strategies. We also discuss the implications of the new-new theory for regulatory
coordination, and on new ways to cooperate with interlocutors in developing countries on the
evolution of 21st century trade policy.
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11 Introduction
When national competitiveness is invoked as a policy objective, trade experts have learned
to retort that countries don't trade, ¯rms do. This focus on the importance of the ¯rm in
international trade is consistent with the most recent developments in trade theory, but policy
needs to catch up. Traditional trade theory argues that countries gain from exporting those
goods and services that they are relatively good at producing while importing goods and services
that other countries are relatively good at producing, but actual trade patterns do not match the
theory. Recognizing the growing anomalies in observed trade patterns, the \new trade theory"
of the 1980s looked at industries not countries, leading Nobel prize-winner Paul Krugman, a
pioneer in this literature, to suggest the need for a new trade policy. Recent work on what
some call the \new-new trade theory" focuses on the trading behaviour of individual ¯rms,
making a tight link between trade and productivity.1 Given the centrality of productivity to
Canadian public policy, trade negotiators must again revise their perspective. In this article
we demonstrate the need for a new new trade policy. In the newest theory, trade still plays an
important role in a country's growth and prosperity, but the role of policy in promoting these
bene¯cial e®ects has changed. We sketch the evolution of this 21st century theory and discuss
its implications for trade policy and research.
2 The Evolution of Trade Theory
Traditional trade theory, rooted in the principle of comparative advantage, adopts countries as
its basic unit for analysis. Countries trade because they are di®erent in terms of technology
and/or their relative supplies of the factors of production (labour, capital, land, etc.). Gains
from trade are, by the same token, realized at the national level. The theory predicts that
trade will be inter-industry (Portugese wine for English wool in Ricardo's famous example).
The theory also predicts that increased trade will result in increased specialization, and that
the greater the di®erences in factor supplies and/or technological development, the greater the
volume of trade among countries. The general policy prediction is that economic welfare for all
could increase through the mutual specialization induced by dismantling of trade barriers.
Life does not conform neatly to theory. Comparative advantage has had limited success in
explaining trade patterns and the observed impact of trade liberalization. By the 1980s, actual
1A list of representative papers in the new and new-new trade theory can be found in the references at the
end of the paper.
2trade appeared to be mostly intra-industry (Europeans buying Boeing jets while Americans buy
Airbus) and mostly between countries that are similar in their factor supplies and technological
level. Liberalizing countries were observed to diversify their production and trade rather than
to specialize. Even worse for theory, the gains from trade liberalization based on comparative
advantage were estimated to be surprisingly small compared to the apparently powerful role that
trade expansion played in the growth of the global economy in the post-World War II period.
Some of these puzzling patterns were partially explained by the \new trade theory" devel-
oped in the 1980s. In this approach, the unit of trade analysis was no longer the country but the
industry. The models incorporated di®erentiated products, and consumers had a correspond-
ing taste for di®erent varieties. Monopolistic competition was the standard industry market
structure with all ¯rms using the same production technologies. The good news: the new trade
theory strengthened the policy case for trade by pointing to new sources of gains - a rise in
e±ciency resulting from increased scale of production and welfare gains for consumers from
access to increased variety and from lower costs of imports. The bad news: new trade theory
opened the door, by at least a crack, to \strategic trade policy"-subsidies for national champions
that might be able to exploit increasing returns to scale through export expansion. Unhappy
theorists emphasized the possibility of \lose-lose" outcomes if rival governments subsidized the
same industry to gain global market share in supposedly strategic industries (as in the case of
commercial aircraft). Unfortunately, some features of trade data were still inconsistent with the
predictions of new trade theory. Exporting industries did not export to all countries as implied
by their theoretical cost advantage and import-competing industries sometimes experienced pro-
ductivity gains following trade liberalization, despite a smaller scale of production.
The next major development in trade theory, the \new-new trade theory" beginning in
the early 2000s, drew its inspiration from dynamic industrial models of ¯rm entry, innovation,
growth, and death. The unit of trade analysis shifted from the industry to the ¯rm. These
models share many of the features of the new trade theory of the 1980s, but now incorporate
di®erences in ¯rms' characteristics both within and across industries, especially with regard to
productivity. This literature has identi¯ed an important additional source of gains from trade-
a rise in productivity as increased trade forces the least e±cient ¯rms out of the market and
reallocates resources and production to the most e±cient ¯rms.
In the next section we elaborate on this ¯rm-level view of trade and discuss the impact of
trade liberalization on the economy when seen through this lens. In the third section, we present
some of the general policy implications emanating from this approach.
33 The Trade World According to the New-New Trade Theory
The new-new theory based on ¯rm-level analysis has generated empirical studies that use ¯rm-
and plant-level data from a wide variety of countries to document a new set of observations
regarding the international activities of ¯rms. The new-new trade literature has generally agreed
on the following stylized facts, with subsidiary implications:
1. Participation in international markets is relatively rare among ¯rms, and export and im-
port intensity among ¯rms that do participate in international markets is low:
² Relatively few ¯rms in an industry export and/or use imported inputs.
² Exporters export only a small portion of their production and imported inputs only
account for a small share of ¯rms' inputs.
2. Firms that participate in international markets are di®erent than those that do not:
² Exporters, ¯rms which use imported inputs, and ¯rms which engage in foreign direct
investment tend to be larger, more productive, relatively more capital- and skilled
labour-intensive, and pay higher wages than ¯rms which do not participate in inter-
national markets.
² Firms entering export markets grow faster in terms of employment and output than
non-exporters.
3. Trade shows considerable dynamism both in terms of changes in the size of existing trade
°ows (the \intensive margin") and in terms of the appearance of new trade °ows - new
products being introduced to export markets or the diversi¯cation of already exported
products to new markets (the \extensive margin"):
² There is continual ¯rm entry into and exit from export markets associated with the
continual change in the composition and destination of exported products.
4. Trade liberalization increases productivity primarily because of within-industry realloca-
tions rather than across-industry reallocations:
² Trade liberalization increases average productivity by reallocating market shares and
resources within industries from low-productivity ¯rms to high-productivity ¯rms.
5. Firm process technology choice is linked to the decision to enter export markets:
4² Firms entering export markets tend to adopt newer, mass production technologies
which increase ¯rm productivity relative to older, more °exible technologies suited
for a smaller domestic market.
Each of these observations emphasizes the critical role of di®erences among ¯rms in the
same industry. Such ¯rm heterogeneity with respect to their production technologies manifests
itself in considerable variation across ¯rms in their decision of whether or not to participate in
international markets and the magnitude of that participation. Trade-related productivity gains
in the economy emanate mainly from a change in the composition of ¯rms within an industry, as
weaker ¯rms exit, and production is reallocated to more e±cient ¯rms that grow faster. These
gains are in addition to the traditionally recognized productivity gains °owing from improved
access to cheaper imported intermediate goods and services, and to the exploitation of plant-level
economies of scale available to the ¯rm with its existing technology.
Empirical evidence also suggests that high productivity at the ¯rm level often precedes entry
into international markets, suggesting the presence of signi¯cant ¯rm-level sunk costs that raise
the productivity threshold that ¯rms must clear to be able to pro¯tably enter foreign markets.
Examples of such costs include the expenditures that ¯rms must undertake to obtain foreign
market intelligence, identify foreign partners, address foreign regulatory requirements, set up
distribution and after-sales service networks in export markets and so forth.
This emphasis in the new-new trade theory on the role of ¯xed costs is also relevant for the
decision at the ¯rm level of whether to serve foreign markets via exports or via (horizontal)
foreign direct investment (FDI). To establish abroad, ¯rms face ¯xed costs of establishing an
a±liate. The theory argues that, if transport costs to a given market outweigh the ¯xed costs of
establishing a foreign a±liate, the ¯rm will choose to serve the foreign market via FDI. There
is some empirical support for this prediction in that ¯rms tend to serve closer foreign markets
through exporting and more distant markets through a foreign a±liate.
The fact that ¯rms must commit signi¯cant resources to enter and sustain a presence in
foreign markets (through exporting, importing, or FDI) also implies that the risks and uncer-
tainties inherent in the international arena loom large. Firms that participate in international
markets face greater uncertainties about success abroad than at home. They may have less
knowledge than local ¯rms in foreign markets (\information asymmetries") and face additional
risks from °uctuations in real and nominal exchange rates or from regulatory changes abroad.
5To summarize, 21st Century theoretical and empirical work in international trade stresses the
important roles of (1) ¯rm-level di®erences, (2) ¯rm-level sunk and ¯xed costs of participating
in international markets, and (3) reallocation of market share and productive resources across
¯rms within industries in response to changes in the trading environment. In the next section,
we explore the policy implications of this new-new trade theory.
4 Towards a New-New Trade Policy
Reciprocity remains fundamental to international relations in general and especially to trade ne-
gotiations, but a mercantilist understanding of reciprocity is more than ever incoherent with the
achievement of the objectives of trade policy. Countries don't trade and industries don't trade:
¯rms trade. Jobs come from productive ¯rms, and typically only the most productive ¯rms
trade. Understanding and acting on this reality requires adjusting the usual models trade nego-
tiators use in identifying their o®ensive and defensive interests and in evaluating the importance
of new agreements.
The emphasis in the new theory on ¯rm-level heterogeneity, the importance of ¯xed costs
of participating in international markets, and the increasing complexity of global strategies of
multinational ¯rms, has not changed the basic message of trade theory that there are gains from
international trade and investment. Indeed, the newest theory suggests that these gains are even
larger than previously thought. However, the policy implications are di®erent. Just as ¯rms are
heterogeneous, so are the impacts of trade policies, depending on the speci¯c facts concerning
the population of ¯rms within an industry in a country and the broader economic policy context
in which trade policy is implemented. In this section we sketch some of the policy implications
of the new-new theory.
4.1 The Importance of Extensive Margin Responses
Trade negotiators typically focus on existing products imported from and exported to current
markets (e.g., top ten export lists). The new-new trade theory and empirical evidence indicate
that trade liberalization is likely to lead, however, to a diversi¯cation of exports and imports, as
well as to an increase of existing °ows. Thus, in the new-new trade policy, the focus should shift
to new ¯rms entering export markets, to incumbent exporters' introduction of new products
into existing markets, and to the diversi¯cation of their exports into new markets. In technical
terms, the focus must shift from intensive margin responses to extensive margin responses.
6To take one example, recent empirical studies suggest that the impact of the WTO for a newly
acceded member is almost exclusively on the extensive margin of trade, (trade in goods that were
not previously traded and/or exports into new markets). Indeed, WTO membership may have
a negligible or even a negative impact on the intensive margin (the volume of already-traded
goods). The evidence also indicates that new preferential agreements, in contrast, appear to have
the opposite e®ect: the reduction in the extensive margin in absolute terms often outweighs the
rise in the intensive margin. Some authors have shown that these changes at the extensive margin
and the rise in imports of new varieties are responsible for important increases in productivity
growth. The WTO, they suggest, by facilitating such trade, has potentially large welfare e®ects.
This research raises questions about the value of new regional agreements; it also implies that
it may be more important to put negotiating resources towards markets where Canadian access
is limited now, rather than aiming at marginal improvements in existing markets.
An intriguing possibility, then, as some authors suggest, is that the WTO is not really about
reducing trade barriers, variable or ¯xed. Rather it serves to resolve uncertainty in the mind
of potential exporters regarding the evolution of international trade rules. They respond by
exporting newer products into newer markets-i.e. responses on the extensive margin. In multi-
lateral trade negotiations in the WTO, it follows, squeezing water in bound tari® rates (which
reduces uncertainty a®ecting the extensive margin) may be more important than ¯ghting for
reductions in applied rates (which may primarily a®ect the intensive margin). Future empirical
research should consider other forms of uncertainty faced by exporters at the extensive margin
including issues covered under non-tari® barriers (NTBs) and trade facilitation. Similarly, with
investment sidelined in Geneva, negotiation e®orts have been devoted to FIPAs. Such agree-
ments appear to focus more on the treatment of established investors in developing countries,
and less on barriers to entry for new investors.
In summary, to evaluate the gains from trade liberalization, trade negotiators must examine
not just the expansion of existing trade °ows but the expansion of imports and exports of
products that previously were not sold internationally, the diversi¯cation of currently exported
products into new markets, and the entry of ¯rms with purely domestic operations into exporting.
4.2 The Importance of Fixed and Sunk Costs of Trade
The presence of signi¯cant ¯xed and sunk costs of exporting, importing, and foreign direct
investment changes the traditional market access agenda. (A further implication is the height-
ened importance that can be attached to trade promotion in the sense of assisting ¯rms to \go
7global.") To the extent that market entry costs deter ¯rms from entering export and import
markets, they also have negative impacts on technology choice, productivity and the dynamism
of Canadian ¯rms. If market failures impede entry into exporting and importing, programs
aimed at assisting ¯rms in overcoming such problems remain important. When the ¯xed costs
of entry into a foreign market are high but tari®s are low, the policy focus must shift to the often
cumbersome and expensive procedures for getting products across borders. Trade facilitation,
as it is known at the WTO, assumes increased importance.
Thus, more important than tari® issues in negotiations on trade in goods (NAMA in the
WTO context) is the achievement of reductions in costs associated with compliance with non-
tari® requirements for market access (e.g., conformance with product safety standards and li-
censing requirements concerning highly technical products or professional competencies etc.).
In North America, the Canada-US Regulatory Cooperation Council should consider how regu-
lations a®ecting imports as well as exports a®ect a ¯rm's ability to exploit new technologies. To
encourage ¯rms to diversify across markets, having compatible regulation all along a complex
supply chain should be a policy objective. Furthermore, if growth in the world economy comes
from Asia, especially China, then that is the market where regulatory obstacles will have the
greatest impact on Canadian ¯rms.
In summary, the new-new trade theory highlights the positive links between ¯rms' access to
foreign markets and aggregate productivity growth. An objective of trade policy should be to
lower regulatory obstacles which limit this access for Canadian ¯rms. In general, there is a role
for policy to create an enabling framework for the global strategies of ¯rms.
4.3 The Importance of Firm-Level Data Analysis
Quantitative analysis is always essential for assessing the magnitude of the impact of trade
liberalization, but negotiators must now examine the characteristics of individual ¯rms, not just
the average characteristics of industries. Analysis of ¯rm-level data is needed to quantify the
distribution of productivity by industry, relative ¯rst to the threshold of export market entry
in the event of a reduction of trade barriers and second to the threshold for market exit in the
event of increased import competition.
Firm-level data is also required to estimate ¯xed and sunk costs associated with partici-
pation in international markets. For example, if no ¯rms in an export-oriented industry are
close to the export threshold and the ¯xed costs of entering export markets are large, the gains
from liberalization may be limited to existing exporters expanding their presence in established
8markets. In this case, the dynamic e®ects of liberalization on productivity and the economy
may be relatively small. In a similar vein, if many import-competing ¯rms are near an exit
threshold (due to their use of dated technologies, say), trade liberalization will exact a dispro-
portionately heavy toll on those ¯rms as they leave the sector. The distributional impacts of
trade liberalization due to accelerated industrial adjustment will loom large and will have to be
weighed against the correspondingly large gains in average productivity within the industry and
the positive dynamic economy-wide e®ects.
Empirical studies using ¯rm-level data for Canadian ¯rms are generally few in number,
especially relative to other countries. Statistics Canada has the data but has not made them
readily available. Since an improved understanding of the factors that a®ect Canadian ¯rm-,
industry-, and economy-level productivity matters for policy, this situation should be remedied
by making these data more accessible. The more that we understand the impact of engaging in
trade at the level of the ¯rm-where trade actually takes place-the better we are positioned to
formulate trade policy in a fully informed manner. An added bene¯t: with access to such data,
researchers will be able to quantitatively assess the bene¯ts of trade agreements for Canadian
¯rms and the Canadian economy.
In summary, data measured at the level where trade actually takes place, the ¯rm, must
be collected and analyzed to provide information for policy makers on the characteristics of
¯rms that do trade and on those that don't (but that are potential entrants into international
markets if trade barriers are reduced). Such data must also be used to allow for a quantitative
assessment of the impact of trade liberalization policies on ¯rm-, industry-, and economy-level
employment, output, productivity, etc. and on Canadian consumers' welfare.
4.4 The Importance of Identifying Value-Added in Traded Goods
The impact on a country's exports of its own import liberalization because of value chain linkages
has been widely recognized by policymakers-for example, Canada recently eliminated all tari®s
on production inputs. With many manufacturing processes today broken down into separate
parts and spread across di®erent countries before the ¯nished product is assembled for export in
one of them, attributing the full value of the product to the country from which it is exported
to its ¯nal consumer destination can give an exaggerated idea of the importance of trade with
that country.
Hence, a new accounting of a country's contribution to global trade is needed to take these
linkages into proper account. In short, we need a value-added concept of exports-and, indeed,
9of imports, recognizing that these might embody Canada's previously exported components or
intellectual property, such as in the case of a Blackberry device assembled in Taiwan and shipped
to Canada. Such a value-added trade account would complement the current trade accounts
based on gross value of trade, which are needed for purposes such as the balance of payments.
In summary, ¯rm-level analysis of trade has highlighted the complex processes behind pro-
ducing goods for exporting, including the use of imported intermediates. Policy makers should
use a value-added approach to measure trade °ows to provide an accurate picture of Canada's
and its trading partners contributions to global trade.
4.5 The Importance of Firm-Level Innovation
The dynamic industrial models that are now at the heart of trade theory take explicit account of
the ongoing need for ¯rms to make investments in new technologies and products in the context
of uncertainty about the outcomes of this investment. For ¯rms, these outcomes can represent
the di®erence between life-sustained or expanded presence in markets-and death-i.e., ¯rm exit
from the market. For countries, successful innovation (and, by the same token, failed innovation)
at the ¯rm level can change their apparent comparative advantage. But just as innovation is
important to trade success, entry into export markets can drive ¯rms to innovate, in particular
in terms of process innovation aimed at achieving cost e±ciency in serving larger markets.
Research and development (R&D), which is critical to sustaining export performance by
generating new products to introduce into world markets as old ones become obsolete, is not
evenly distributed across ¯rms; it is concentrated in ¯rms that tend to be large and multi-
national. In this context, the pronounced home bias in R&D activity in multinational ¯rms
tends to concentrate innovation in the countries that are the main sources for outward FDI. For
smaller countries, inward FDI may therefore be a two-edged sword-bringing the conventionally
understood bene¯ts of superior technologies and business methods (re°ecting the fact that only
the most productive ¯rms in any country can overcome the costs of becoming a multinational)
but also sapping the vitality of the local innovation system. Canada's poor R&D record notwith-
standing one of the world's most generous tax incentive structures may have something to do
with the fact that it is one of the most highly foreign-invested economies in the world.
In summary, new-new trade policy cannot be conducted without reference to other areas of
policy such as industrial and innovation policy. Policy implications thus °ow in both directions-
from trade to innovation policies and vice versa. The dynamic industrial models that have been
integrated into the new-new trade theory recognize that ¯rms must invest in new technology on
10an ongoing basis to remain competitive. At the same time, the ¯rm-level empirical literature on
innovation shows that trade engagement is tightly linked to both product and process innovation.
4.6 The Di±culty of Firm-Level Consultations
Trade policy still begins at home: negotiators cannot know their objectives without talking to
economic actors and citizens, but knowing whom to talk to is now more complicated. The usual
story has been that, at the economy-wide level, overall welfare gains from trade liberalization
allow winners to compensate losers at least implicitly-hence the logic of the WTO Single Under-
taking. We have always understood, however, that this economic logic faces political di±culties:
for example, gains for service providers don't help displaced dairy farmers. The new-new trade
theory implies that the di®erential gains within industries complicate the picture even further.
Import-competing industries that will shrink as a result of liberalization will nonetheless likely
have ¯rms that become winners, expanding their share of the domestic markets and possibly
entering export markets. Consultations thus need to include potential new exporters as well as
existing exporters.
At the same time, it is evident that it will be di±cult to mobilize industry associations
in support of negotiations since they will be con°icted because they represent both winners
and losers. Industry associations tend to be more cautious in supporting trade liberalization
when winners and losers are likely to be found in the same industry, rather than winners being
concentrated in some industries and losers in others; this makes mobilization of support for new
agreements more di±cult.
Negotiators face di±culty ¯nding vocal support to counter vocal opposition to new agree-
ments. The traditional solution has been ¯rst to research the net bene¯t to consumers of
bilateral/multilateral trade liberalization and then second to undertake economic studies of the
impact on key industries - automobiles, for example. The new-new trade approach implies that
perhaps that this second step is dated. Negotiators need research on how ¯rms bene¯t, not
industries. From a communications standpoint such research allows a focus on concrete entities
with real plants and identi¯able local jobs.
5 Conclusions
Thinking about ¯rms not just industries will lead to exciting new opportunities for Canadian
trade negotiators. It will also create challenges. The new-new trade policy underlines the need
11to start now to develop the agenda for the next round of multilateral trade negotiations, but
explaining the new agenda to traditional interlocutors in business and other trade ministries
will not be easy. Developing new models and data sources will also be di±cult. But the payo®
is the opportunity for more targeted trade policy and trade promotion. Even more important,
the new-new theory places trade policy at the heart of the government's productivity agenda.
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